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CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) V.
BEDFORD: THE WORLD'S OLDEST
PROFESSION STRUGGLES TO CARVE
OUT A FUTURE FOR ITSELF
John J. Kappel*
June 13, 2013,' the Supreme Court of Canada heard oral argu-
ment in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford. Final argument
in front of the Supreme Court was the culmination of a four-year
legal battle to change Canada's prostitution laws. The Supreme Court's
forthcoming decision has the potential to strike down up to three laws
that criminalize acts related to prostitution2 and may cause a dramatic
change in the prevalence, nature, and safety of prostitution throughout
Canada. The first section of this article provides procedural background
for the case and information about the parties; the second section out-
lines each of the challenged statutes and the practical effect of each stat-
ute; and the third section addresses the two lower courts' decisions with
respect to each statute.
I. PARTIES AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The case originated in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.3 Terri
Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and Valerie Scott (the applicants), three
women who have worked as prostitutes in various capacities,4 applied for
declaratory relief5 in the Superior Court, requesting from the Court an
order declaring that three Canadian criminal statutes violated the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (The Charter).6 The three chal-
lenged statutes criminalize conduct relating to and associated with the
sale of sex, but actually selling or buying sex is not, in itself, illegal in
Canada.7
* John graduated from Baylor University with a B.S. in Economics in 2011. He is
currently a J.D. candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law and will be graduating
in May 2014.
1. Docket, SuLuman Cour oF CANADA, WWW.SCC-CSC.gc.calcase-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=34788 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
2. See infra II.
3. Bedford v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
4. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, paras. 10-12 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
5. Bedford v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2010 ONSC 4264, para. 4 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
6. Id.
7. Id. para. 3.
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A. PARTIES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
The initial dispute was between the three applicants and the Attorney
General of Canada who supported the three challenged statutes as con-
forming to The Charter.8 The Attorney General of Ontario intervened
on behalf of and with essentially the same legal arguments as the Attor-
ney General of Canada. 9 In addition, three interest groups: the Christian
Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada, and the Catholic Civil
Rights League intervened on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada
with arguments rooted in policy and legislative objectives.10 The inter-
venors' arguments were based on the assertion that disapproval of prosti-
tution by the Canadian population at large makes limiting prostitution a
legitimate legislative objective that can be pursued by criminalizing con-
duct tangential to prostitution without offending The Charter."
The intervention of all three groups was opposed by the applicants who
appealed the intervention to the Ontario Court of Appeals.12 Finding
that the intervenors had "a real, substantial, and identifiable interest in
the subject matter of the application and an important perspective differ-
ent from the parties," the Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of
all three organizations.' 3
B. DECISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
A seven day trial was held in the Ontario Superior Court in October of
2009.14 On September 28, 2010, after eleven months of deliberation, the
Superior Court released its judgment in the matter.15 In a massive 132-
page opinion, the Superior Court found that all three challenged statutes
were in violation of The Charterl6 and consequently struck down all
three.17 Likely understanding the dramatic effects that might be caused
by such a radical change in the law, the application judge decided to stay
the Superior Court's decision for two months so that the decision could
be appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeals.' 8
Two months later, the Ontario Court of Appeals heard a motion to stay
the judgment of the Superior Court until the Court of Appeals could hear
and decide the appeal.19 At the hearing, the Court of Appeals extended
the stay until its decision on the motion to stay was reached. 20 On De-
8. Id. paras. 8-13.
9. Id. para. 19.
10. Id. para. 22-23.
11. Id. paras. 23-24.
12. Id. para. 22.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id. para. 3.
17. Id.
18. See Canada (Att'y General) v. Bedford, 2010 ONCA 814, para. 3 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. para. 3.
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cember 2, 2010,21 the Court of Appeals released a forty-two page decision
staying the Superior Court's judgment until the Court of Appeals could
hear the appeal.22 The court favored the Attorney General's argument
that the legislative void created by the sudden absence of the three stuck
laws would be detrimental to the public interest over the applicants' argu-
ment that the stay would perpetuate the harm caused by the statutes.23
C. PARTIES ON APPEAL
When the case was brought up on appeal, all three applicants were
present as respondents24 and the Attorney General of Ontario joined the
Attorney General of Canada as appellant.25 In addition to the original
group of intervenors, twelve more organizations were allowed to inter-
vene in the appeal. 26 The majority of the intervenors supported the deci-
sion of the application judge in its entirety and a minority opposed the
decision completely or partially.27 Most notably, the appeal drew the at-
tention of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association,28 which intervened in
support of the Superior Court's decision. 29
D. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals heard the Attorney General's appeal over five
days in June of 2011.30 Evidently not to be one-upped by the Superior
Court, after only nine months of deliberation 31 the Court of Appeals re-
leased its own equally massive 132-page majority opinion along with a
sixteen page partial dissent.32 The three judge majority partially agreed
with the application judge and held that two of the three challenged stat-
utes were a violation of The Charter.33 The majority disagreed with the
application judge with respect to the validity of the third statute, holding
that it should not be struck down.34 The two judge minority was in essen-
tially complete agreement with the application judge's decision to strike
down all three laws.35 This created an effectively unanimous court af-
firming the application judge's decision against two of the three chal-
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id. para. 5.
23. Id. para. 4.
24. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, paras. 10-12 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
25. Id. para. 46.
26. Id. para. 47.
27. Id.
28. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association "promote[s] respect for and observance
of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, and [works to] to defend, extend,
and foster recognition of these rights and liberties." About CCLA, CANADIAN
Civii LIniiuwns AssocIATIoN, http://ccla.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2013).
29. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, at 2 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id. paras. 5-6, 8.
34. Id. paras. 7-8.
35. Id. para. 333 (MacPherson J.A., dissenting in part).
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lenged statutes and just a bare majority upholding the third.36
Doubtlessly recognizing the landmark nature and enormous potential
ramifications of the case, the Supreme Court granted both sides leave to
appeal and extended the stay on the judgments of both of the lower
courts until the Supreme Court hears the appeal and cross-appeal.37
II. YES, YOU CAN SELL SEX, BUT THERE IS A CATCH
OR THREE
Selling and buying sex is, in and of itself, legal in Canada.38 But the
Canadian Parliament has elected to pass several laws that criminalize
conduct related to prostitution.39 The first such law challenged in Bed-
ford outlaws brothels and their equivalents; the second makes it illegal to
profit from someone else's acts of prostitution; and the third makes it
illegal to publicly solicit prostitution.
A. No BROTHELS, BORDELLOS, OR BAWDY-HOUSEs PLEASE
The Canadian Criminal Code provides, in pertinent part, that it is ille-
gal for anyone to keep,40 be an inmate of,4 1 or be found without a lawful
excuse in a "common bawdy-house." 42 It is also illegal for an owner,
landlord, lessor, etc. to knowingly permit a place under his or her control
to be used for the purposes of a "common bawdy-house." 43 A "common
bawdy-house" is defined as a place that is "kept or occupied" 44 or "re-
sorted to by one or more persons45 for the purpose of prostitution or
practice of acts of indecency." 46
1. You Live in a What?!
This provision makes it illegal to operate a conventional brothel or its
equivalent. This means that any effort by several prostitutes to collabo-
rate and create a well-known, established, and secure location to service
clients is illegal. Notably, this provision also makes it illegal for a lone
prostitute to own a designated location where the prostitute services his
or her clients.47 This includes even the prostitute's home.48 If a prosti-
tute were to sell sex out of his or her home, the prostitute's home would
legally become a "common bawdy-house" within the meaning of the stat-
36. Id.
37. Application for Leave, No. 34788, Oct. 25 2012 (Can.).
38. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, para. 2 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
39. Id.
40. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 210(1) (Can.).
41. Id. § 210(2)(a).
42. Id. § 210(2)(b).
43. Id. § 210(2)(c).
44. Id. § 197(1)(a).
45. Id. § 197(1)(b).
46. Id. § 197(1).
47. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, para. 14 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
48. Id.
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ute and the prostitute would be guilty of a crime.4 9 Consequently, a pros-
titute who wishes to provide services to his or her client must do so either
at the client's residence or a hotel room; the Court describes this as "out-
call work."5 0
B. No ASSISTANCE FOR YOU AND No AVAILS FOR EVERYONE ELSE
The Canadian Criminal Code provides, in pertinent part, that it is ille-
gal for anyone "[to live] wholly or in part on the avails of [the] prostitu-
tion of another person." 5  This particular provision was likely designed
to outlaw pimping or other behavior that exploited another person by
using them as a prostitute.5 2 The Court of Appeals noted, however, that
this provision also imposes criminal penalties on anyone who provides
services to prostitutes because they are prostitutes.53 This would include
bodyguards, drivers, agents, assistants, etc. This means that the law that
was designed to prevent the exploitation of prostitutes actually has the
effect of imposing criminal penalties on people who are not exploiting
prostitutes, but are in actuality providing services to prostitutes that help
them and, in some cases, services that make selling sex considerably
safer.54
C. AND ABSOLUTELY No SUGGESTIVE REMARKS ABOUT SAILORS
The Canadian Criminal Code provides, in pertinent part, that it is ille-
gal for anyone who "stops or attempts to stop any person or in any man-
ner communicates or attempts to communicate with any person for the
purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of
a prostitute in a public place or in any place open to public view." 55 A
"public place" is defined to include any place to which the public has an
implied or express invitation or right of access;56 this includes a motor
vehicle that is in a public place or in a place open to public view.57
This prohibition on public solicitation of the sale of sex by either a
would-be buyer or a would-be seller creates an effective ban on street
prostitution.5 8 The extension of the definition of public place to include
any motor vehicle in a public place or even simply in any place visible to
the public makes it all but impossible for prostitutes to offer their services
to anyone that they encounter in public even though actually selling sex
to someone that a prostitute meets in a public place is not itself illegal.5 9
49. Id.
50. Id. para. 16.
51. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 212(1)(j) (Can.).
52. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, para. 19 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 213(1)(c) (Can.).
56. Id. § 197(l).
57. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, para. 15 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (cit-
ing Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 213(2) (Can.)).
58. Id. para. 18.
59. See id.
415
416 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
III. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE SECURITY OF THE PERSON
The combined effect of the three aforementioned laws criminalizing
conduct related to prostitution was not well received by people who sell
sex for a living.60 The result was a constitutional challenge to all three
statutes by the applicants in Bedford. The basis for the challenge was
rooted in sections 1, 2, and 7 of The Charter.6'
A. LEGAL BUT EXTREMELY RESTRICTED ...
When sections 210, 212, and 213 of the Criminal Code are considered
simultaneously, it becomes apparent that while selling sex in the abstract
is completely legal in Canada, actually doing so is unreasonably difficult.
Section 210 outlaws brothels and everything even remotely similar so that
a prostitute cannot simply wait in a fixed location for clients to come to
him or her; section 212 prevents a prostitute from hiring anyone to assist
him or her in finding clients; and section 213 outlaws soliciting the sale of
sex in public. 6 2 The ultimate effect is that a prostitute must rely on clients
privately contacting him or her to provide services in the client's home or
in a hotel room. 63
B. ... Is EXTREMELY UNACCEPTABLE
It is the position of the applicants that the condition created by these
three statutes deprives them of their right to life, liberty, and security of
the person (section 7 of The Charter),64 that the deprivation is not in ac-
cordance with principles of fundamental justice (section 1 of The Char-
ter),6 5 and that the communicating provision in section 213 is a violation
of their freedom of expression (section 2 of The Charter).6 6
When evaluating the applicants' claims that the three statutes violated
The Charter, the application judge considered eighty-eight volumes of ev-
idence totally over 25,000 pages. 67 Most of the evidence was in the form
of affidavits of people that had first-hand experience with prostitution or
were considered experts on the subject. 68 The evidence included infor-
mation about prostitution in other countries including: Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States (focusing on Nevada). 69
60. See id. paras. 15-19.
61. Id. para. 20.
62. Id. paras. 15-19.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 20.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Superior Court conducted a section 2 analysis for section 213, but the
Court of Appeals determined that precedent from the Supreme Court indicated
that section 213 was not in violation of section 2 of The Charter. Id. para. 86. The
Court of Appeals concluded that stare decisis prevented either lower court from
revisiting the question. Id.
67. Id. para. 23.
68. Id. paras. 23-24.
69. Id. para. 24.
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C. AN UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE WITH THE SECURITY OF
THE PERSON
After reviewing the enormous amount of evidence presented to the
Court, the application judge reached four specific findings of social and
legislative fact that the Court of Appeals agreed with: (1) "prostitution is
inherently dangerous for prostitutes;"7 0 (2) "there are 'safety enhancing'
measures that prostitutes can take to mitigate the risk of physical
harm;"7 (3) "each of the challenged Criminal Code provisions criminal-
izes at least one 'safety enhancing' measure that prostitutes could take to
reduce the danger of physical harm;" 72 and (4) "the criminalization of
measures that could make prostitution safer has the effect of increasing
the risk of physical harm to prostitutes who engage in prostitution." 7 3
Both lower courts agreed that this grouping of facts indicated that pros-
titutes are prevented "from taking precautions, some extremely rudimen-
tary, that can decrease the risk of violence towards them." 74 Prostitutes
are essentially forced to decide "between their liberty and their security
of the person."75 While it may be a "client who inflicts violence upon a
prostitute, . . . the law plays a sufficient contributory role in preventing a
prostitute from taking steps that could reduce the risk of such violence." 76
This led both courts to conclude that the three challenged provisions de-
nied the applicants their right to security of the person under section 7 of
The Charter.77
D. Two-THIRDS OF A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
Having found that all three provisions violate section 7 of The Charter,
both courts then asked whether the violations were in accord with the
abstract notion of fundamental justice. Both courts found that the
"bawdy-house" provision, while made with a legitimate purpose, was
overbroad and therefore violated the principles of fundamental justice
and should therefore be struck.7 8 Similarly, the "living on the avails" pro-
vision was found to be overbroad by the Court of Appeals and overbroad
and arbitrary by the Superior Court, causing both courts, although for
somewhat different reasons, to find that the statute violated the principles
of fundamental justice and should therefore be struck.79 The Superior
Court found the "communicating" provision to be grossly disproportion-
ate and held it to violate the principles of fundamental justice as a re-




74. Id. para. 101 (quoting Bedford v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2010 ONSC 4264, para. 362
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)).
75. Id. (quoting Bedford v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2010 ONSC 4264, para. 362 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)).
76. Id.
77. Id. para. 142.
78. Id. para. 172.
79. Id. para. 221.
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sult.80 The Court of Appeals disagreed and did not find the
"communicating" provision to be arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly dispro-
portionate.81 As a result, the Court of Appeals overturned the Superior
Court's decision and upheld the provision instead.82
E. THE SUPREME COURT'S FORTHCOMING DECISION
Given the considerable time that both of the lower courts spent delib-
erating, there is little chance of getting quick decision-or a short opin-
ion-from the Supreme Court. Given that the lower courts struck down
the "bawdy-house" and "living on the avails of" provisions unanimously,
it seems likely that one or both will be similarly struck by the Supreme
Court. Considering the close split in the Court of Appeals, it seems en-
tirely possible that the Supreme Court may strike down the "communi-
cating in public" provision as well. Even if only one of the three statutes
were held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the result would
likely create a significant change in the lives of prostitutes and possibly
Canadian society as a whole.
80. Id. para. 229.
81. Id. para. 323.
82. Id. para. 324.
